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SELECTIVE HEARING: A CHALLENGE
TO THE FCC'S INDECENCY POLICY
For five hundred years a struggle was fought, and in
a few countries won, for the right of the people to
speak and print freely, unlicensed, uncensored, and
uncontrolled. But new technologies of electronic
communication may now relegate old and freed
media... to a corner of the public forum.
Electronic modes of communication that enjoy lesser
rights are moving to center stage. And so, as speech
increasingly flows over those electronic media, the
five-century growth of an unabridged right of citizens
to speak without controls may be endangered.'
I. Introduction
Freedom of speech and of the press, the touchstones of
American democracy, have evolved hand in hand with the printed
word.2 But in the communications revolution now afoot, print is
being replaced as the most valuable information resource.' No longer
do Americans turn only to the pages of the leading papers to receive
news and opinions on important social topics; radio and television
have become vital elements of today's media.4 The promises of
'ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 1 (1983).
2 See generally POOL, supra note 1 (presenting a thorough discussion of new
technologies in the broadcasting industry and suggesting appropriate legal responses).
3 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116 (1973) (referring to the
broadcast industry, the Court stated "it must be kept in mind that we are dealing with
a vital part of our system of communication. The electronic media have swiftly become
a major factor in the dissemination of ideas and information."); see also Brandywine-
Maine Line Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("This is the
electronic age-an age in which communications systems relay information to an eager
public in fractions of milli-seconds.").
4 See CBS, 412 U.S. at 116 (recognizing that in 1973 there were already more than
7000 licensed broadcast stations); Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, 473 F.2d at 42 (finding
that "our method of getting information [has] changed in the last half century. We are
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broadcasting present possibilities never imagined for the traditional
press.5  We must pay a price, however, for the speed and
convenience of the electronic information. Because this information
is being delivered to us by electronic airwaves, we have allowed the
Federal Communications Commission. [hereinafter FCC] to make
value judgments on the language chosen by the speaker.6
Consequently, as print is left behind in this technological change, so
too is absolute First Amendment protection for the press.7
The current position of the FCC is to scrutinize program
content and to impose fines on violators.' Since 1987, broadcast
regulation has signaled the beginning of a forceful, "yet ironically
silent," campaign to remove indecency from radio.9 Prompted by
proposals from the "morally correct majority,""0 the FCC
shifting our emphasis from the printed media to the electronic media. Radio and
television consume massive portions of America's time.").
See generally POOL, supra note 1.
6 See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 49 (1987). Powe notes that the foremost consequence of excluding
broadcasting from the print tradition is the conclusion that broadcasters must be licensed;
"[n]o one could occupy a frequency without the [FCCI determination that the operation
would be in the 'public interest' . . . a term left purposely undefined." Id. (emphasis
added).
See generally POOL, supra note 1.
See Paul Farhi, FCC Indecency Ban Lifted, BERGEN RECORD, Nov. 24, 1993, at
Al, A12 ("The FCC has invoked various incarnations of its indecency policy five times
since 1988 to fine the employer of radio personality Howard Stern more than $1.2
million.").
" Rocio de Lourdes Cordoba, To Air Or Not To Err: The Threat of Federal Funds
for Indecent Progranuning on Public Broadcasting, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 635, 635 (1991).
1o See 138 CONG. RE6. 57304 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Helms).
[W]e are raising a generation of children who are desensitized to
violence and who assume that sexual promiscuity and profane
language are acceptable forms of behavior. Unspeakable [sic] trashy
radio and television are contributing to the decline of traditional
fatily values. Do we not have a moral obligation to stand up and
fight for the preservation of family values? If we remain silent, if
we do nothing, we become a party to the pollution of the minds of
our children and the degeneration of our society.
Id. (emphasis added); see also John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The
Curious History of the New FCC Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38 CATH. U. L. REv.
329, 345-47 (1989).
On July 23, 1986, in a memo to the FCC, Morality in Media
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Commissioners have made it their duty to defend the morality of the
airwaves. 1 During an era of alleged broadcast deregulation that
began during the Reagan administration," Congress and the FCC
have gradually "tightened their grasps on indecent broadcasting" 3 by
expanding the concept of offensiveness. 4
After consistently limiting the definition of "indecency" to the
use of seven "dirty words" broadcast after six a.m. and before ten
p.m., 5 in 1987 the FCC changed its focus in three simultaneously
outlined the steps the FCC should take to crack down on "indecent"
programming and provided a legal analysis of the basis for
proceeding. After leaving his position as White House
Communications Director, Patrick Buchanan wrote a public
memorandum to the President in which he suggested that the FCC
should "jerk" a [broadcaster's] license to help re-establish ties
between the Republican party and the religious right.
Id. (emphasis added).
" See Cordoba, supra note 9, at 635 ("Broadcasting . . . has become the target of
legislation that highlights the federal government's morality campaign."); Crigler &
Byrnes, supra note 10, at 362 ("The [indecency] statute casts Congress in the role of
defender of the 'decent, moral values' of the country, a role few congressmen can afford
to reject .... ").
12 See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 344 ("For the 8 years of the Reagan
Presidency, the rallying cry of the FCC was 'deregulation.' The [FCC] devoted its
efforts to the goals of simplifying or eliminating existing regulations and reducing the
level of governmental intrusion into the editorial decisions of broadcasters.").
" See Cordoba, supra note 9, at 635.
14 See Paul J. Feldman, The FCC and Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: Is There
a National Broadcast StandardAudience?, 41 FED. COM. L. J. 369, 370 ("In three cases
decided in April of 1987, the [FCC] stated that . . . it would both enforce indecency
regulations and interpret the definition of indecency to include a broader range of
material .... "); cf. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 344 ("The institution of a
complex and highly intrusive new indecency policy runs directly contrary to
[deregulation] goals." (emphasis added)).
's See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that the FCC has the
power to regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent but not obscene); see also T.
BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FouRTH ESTATE 824 (6th
ed. 1994). In Pacifica, George Carlin, a "satiric humorist," recorded a twelve-minute
monologue entitled "Filthy Words" which was subsequently aired over Pacifica's FM
radio station in New York City on a Tuesday afternoon at two p.m. after the station had
aired a warning that the monologue included language that might offend some listeners.
Carlin's theme was "the words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves . ... "
Carlin then proposed a basic list: "The original seven words were shit, piss, fuck, cunt,
cocksucker, mother-fucker, and tits." Carlin then discussed "shit" and "fuck" at length,
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released opinions.' 6 These new rulings delayed the legal time to
broadcast "indecent" material from ten p.m. to midnight and
redefined what type of program content, would be considered
indecent. 7 No longer would the indecency standard be limited to the
seven dirty words; rather, the FCC reverted back to its former
generic definition of indecency,.' Thus, "language or material that
depicts or describes in terms patently offensive, as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory activities or organs," would be considered "indecent." 9
These three decisions signaled a dramatic departure from the
prior narrow application of FCC v. Pacifica,2" and caused panic
among broadcasters. 2' Pacifica had previously set the standard for
the indecency rule22-the Court pointed to certain "dirty words"23 that
had been broadcast, and held that these words were legally indecent
for the medium.24 The standard was definite and limited, providing
a broadcaster with guidelines by. which to make programming
decisions.25 However, with the return to a more general standard,
where indecency is not limited to certain words, broadcasters can no
including the various phrases that use each word. Id.
6 See Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987); Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987); Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987).
'? See Report and Order: In the Matter of Enforcement of Prohibitions Against
Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, FCC no. 93-42) (adopted Jan. 19, 1993)
(released Jan. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Report and Order]; see also Cordoba, supra note
9, at 635 ("No longer was indecency limited to certain prohibited words.").
's See Cordoba, supra note 9, at 635.
'9 See Report and Order, supra note 17.
20 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
23 See DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC
MASS MEDIA 540 (2d ed. 1991).
22d.
2 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-48; see supra note 15.
24 Id. at 750-51.
25Id.
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longer be sure whether they are in compliance With the indecency
statute or if they are indeed airing illegally indecent material.26
The broadcasters' confusion is understandable. The FCC
provided little guidance in its report," and in response to requests for
reconsideration or clarification,28 the FCC stated that "indecency will
be judged by the standard of an average broadcast viewer or listener"
and emphasized that determinations would necessarily be made on a
case-by-case basis after reviewing all attendant circumstances. 29 Yet
this reply did not prove sufficient. The broadcasters still have to
determine who the "average broadcast viewer or listener" instanced
by the FCC is; what the viewer might consider "patently offensive";
what "contemporary community standards" are;3" and whether this is
a local or a national standard.3"
The existence of these questions demonstrates the vagueness
of regulations, like the indecency statute, under which broadcasters
must operate.32 It is well established that vague laws tend to create
See Cordoba, supra note 9, at 641 ("[B]roadcasters, therefore, remain in a
precarious position. First, because they continue to perceive the current indecency
definition as vague, broadcasters remain unclear as to when fully protected speech ends
and actionable indecency begins.").
See Report and Order, supra note 17.
See Petition for Declaratory Ruling, Pacifica Found., FCC Ref. No. C5-574 (FCC
filed May 8, 1987) [hereinafter Petition].
' Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 933 (1987) [hereinafter
Reconsideration Order]. See also infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
3 See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 336-37 ("Because this generic definition
involves numerous subjective judgements as to what, at any given time, is 'patently
offensive' according to 'contemporary community standards,' it necessarily provides
licensees with a murky standard of lawful conduct.").
3' See Feldman, supra note 14, at 371. "The [FCC] stated that the standard was 'not
one based on a local standard, but one based on a broader standard for broadcasting
generally.'" Id. (quoting Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R., at 933). The announced
standard did not specify a geographic area. But the term "broadcasting generally"
suggests a national standard which is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's holding
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973), where "contemporary community
standards" of "patent offensiveness" were held to be judged by a local standard.
32 See generally GINSBURG ET AL, supra note 21. Content regulations were
originally announced as a way to diversify broadcast programming and to provide
reasonable public access to the airwaves. Regulations such as the reasonable access rule,
the equal opportunity rule and the fairness doctrine represent the forms these laws have
taken. The reasonable access and equal opportunity rules provide candidates for federal
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a chilling effect on speech, and within the broadcasting scenario, this
effect is quite clear." Under the current scheme of indecency policy
enforcement, every broadcaster must carefully consider all material
before it is aired and will most likely avoid any programming that is
even slightly questionable.3 4 However, broadcasters may be able to
rely on a more precise future as, the current indecency policy was
recently held unconstitutional by the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit.
35
This Note analyzes broadcasting's.current situation against the
backdrop of our First Amendment tradition of freedom of the press.
The first part of this Note will discuss the history of broadcast
regulation under the power and duty of the FCC and will compare its
treatment to that of the print media in the free speech and free press
arena. 3' The analysis will consider justifications for the "special"
restrictions imposed on the electronic media and will question their
continued relevance. 37 The second part will consider the impact of
content regulations upon First Amendment values and compare the
FCC and the Supreme Court's treatment of freedom of speech with
the framers' intent.38 The third part will explore the current status of
"indecency" and recognize the limitations placed upon broadcasters
by the indecency statute. 9 The views presented question the basis for
defining indecency and discuss the enforcement of the statute in
office with access to broadcast facilities to air their views on public matters. The
fairness doctrine required broadcasters to provide reasonable coverage of controversial
issues and an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. However, the
fairness doctrine is no longer in effect. Id.
3 See generally POOL, supra note 1.
See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 362-63.
" See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
vacated, reh'g granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
3' As a practical matter, this Note will not discuss the entire history of broadcasting
and many important aspects will be neglected. For a comprehensive introduction to the
field, see generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1991).
"' This Note will focus on radio broadcasting rather than television broadcasting or
common carriage which includes the telephone, the telegraph, the postal system, and
some computer networks. See generally GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 21. However,
some of the research supplied will necessarily refer to these other forms of broadcasting.
See infra notes 161-205 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 206-68 and accompanying text.
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relation to the various interests involved (for example, parents,
broadcasters, adult listeners).4" This part will present an analysis of
whether the FCC's public interest standard should include
considerations of program popularity.4" The theory presented is that
program popularity should be an element of FCC consideration in the
development of the "public interest" standard since audience figures
and market realities demonstrate that current FCC standards may not
accurately reflect what the public considers indecent.42 The Note will
conclude with the proposition that the FCC's current indecency
standards are both impermissibly vague. and unconstitutionally
overbroad, a theory supported by the most recent decision to date on
the issue.43
I. Broadcast v. Print-Different
Constitutional Standards
Central to the function of our democratic society is its system
of freedom of expression." In our society, that system rests to a
major degree upon the constitutional protections embodied by the
First Amendment.45  Accordingly, American society has long
perceived the need to protect that freedom and has identified at least
four broad categories of values where "[m]aintenance of a system of
free expression is necessary (1) as a method of assuring individual
self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method
of securing participation by the members of the society in social,
including political, decision-making, and (4) as a means of
o See ihfra notes 222-68 and accompanying text.
4, See, e.g., Joshua Mills, He Keeps Giving New Meaning to Gross Revenue, N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, § 3, at 7 ("America's fivorite programming currently runs the
risk of being fined.").
42 id.
41 See generally. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 170 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), vacated, reh'g granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane).
4THoMAs I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT
3 (1966).
' Id. "The right of the individual to freedom of expression has deep roots in our
history."
A A
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maintaining the balance between stability and change in society." 46
These principles have guided our society to embrace a strong belief
in First Amendment protection for the press.
The first principle of communications law in the United States
is the guarantee of freedom in the First Amendment.47 However, the
American communications system is actually divided into three
parts-print, common carriage, and broadcasting-and each has been
afforded different levels of constitutional protection.48 The FCC and
the courts have established a highly restrictive role in the domain of
broadcasting that does not exist for print. 49  Broadcasters must be
licensed by the FCC to communicate their message.50 In exchange,
they become duty-bound to a "public interest" standard which has no
equivalent in the print media industry.51
The Supreme Court. has long embraced a "hands off"
approach to print media content and accordingly has prevented the
government from imposing "public interest" standards on the
traditional press.52 Yet governmental imposition of content-based
Id. A complete historical review of freedom of speech in this country is clearly
beyond the scope of this Note. However, it is enough to recognize that freedom of
speech has always been regarded as an important part of our country's history and theory
of democracy.
47 See, e.g., POOL, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. "The laws have evolved separately and with little relation to another."
9Every radio spectrum user muts be licensed. Id.
10 See 47 U S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) which provides in relevant part:
It is the purpose of this chapter . . to maintain the control of the
United States. over all the channels of radio transmission; and to
provide for the. use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof,
by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by
Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create
any right, beyond the terms, conditions and periods of the license.
Id. (emphasis added).
"I In NBC v. FCC, 319 U.S. 239 (1942), the Supreme Court first stated that the
airwaves are public property and allowed the government to regulate broadcasting for
the "public good." Using this rationale, the government has regulated the airwaves,
through licensing, based on how the public interest would best be served. See David M.
Coyne, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting, 69 CAL. L. REV. 555, 582-83
(1981).
52 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (considering
whether a state statute granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to
criticism by a newspaper violates the guarantees of a free press). The majority held that
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regulations of speech has been supported by the Court53 in the
broadcasting arena based on little more than outdated notions and
unjustified fears of a constantly expanding communications industry.'
Consequently, these misguided beliefs have resulted in lesser
the statute:
[Flails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its
intrusion into the function of the editors . . . .A newspaper is more
than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment and
advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper [such as]
the decisions made as to . . .content, [and] the treatment of public
issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process
can be exercised consistent with the First Amendment.
Id. at 258 (emphasis added); Near v. Minnesota,'283 U.S. 697 (1931). At issue in Near
was the so-called 1925 Minnesota Gag Law which allowed the state to temporarily
and/or permanently shut down a publication held to be a "public nuisance." J.M. Near
was a publisher of The Saturday Press, a Minneapolis weekly which, in a series of
articles, had been charging that Jewish gangsters controlled gambling, racketeering, and
bootlegging in the city. .The paper was charged and convicted under the Gag Law as a
"malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" publication. Id. at 706. The Supreme Court
reversed that conviction, finding that Minnesota was engaging in censorship. Id. at 712.
51 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). At issue in
Red Lion was the validity of FCC rules and regulations which require broadcasters to
offer to an individual personally attacked in broadcasts, and to political candidates who
were not endorsed by a station, a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's
facilities. In an opinion by Justice White, the unanimous view was that the
Commission's equal time rules were authorized by Congress and did not abridge the
freedom of speech and press; Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio
Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932). In Trinity Church, the Supreme Court
considered for the first time the extent of past program review the FCC could consider
in a license renewal application. In this case, the broadcaster, Bob, Shuler, had made
personal attacks on Los Angeles public officials. Upon Shuler's application for renewal,
the Federal Radio Commission [hereinafter FRC] held a hearing and subsequently a full
Commission review which resulted in Shuler's station KGEF being ordered off the air
due to Shuler's "outrageous and unfounded attacks" on public officials. On appeal, the
D.C. Circuit observed that the First Amendment does not bar the government from
refusing to renew a "license to one who has abused it" by broadcasting "defamatory and
untrue matter." Id. at 851. The court recognized that the FRC had a duty to scrutinize
a licensee's past programming to ascertain whether renewal would be in the public
interest. Id. Formerly, the FRC was the administrative body vested with the broad
jurisdiction created by the Radio Act of 1927. See L. Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and
Radio Broadcasting, 177 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 179, 195 (1935).
" See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 376
n. 11 (1984) (acknowledging that the scarcity doctrine has been criticized as obsolete).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
protections and more restrictions for members of today's electronic
press.55
Regardless of whether the print and broadcast media are
constitutionally distinguishable, they have always been perceived as
different.56 For instance, although broadcasting and print serve the
same functions-to inform, to educate and to entertain 7T-broadcasting
is technically different and these differences have resulted in a lesser
degree of protection for the broadcast medium.58 Partly because of
the physical differences between the two and because of the status of
broadcasting as a newcomer in the field of journalism,59
the government has justified regulation based on problems
broadcasting might present.6 °
In the early days of broadcasting, few people could
comprehend the scope of the new medium. 61  Unfortunately this
resulted in a belief that broadcasting would be used primarily for
entertainment purposes, 62 and as such, would not be entitled to all the
First Amendment protection enjoyed by the traditional press.63
" See Coyne, supra note 51, at 575-76. The perception of the broadcast medium
has led to content regulation of the "broadcast message" without "the protest that would
accompany a similar imposition on the print medium." Id.
56 See Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 20-21 (1978) ("This difference in perception goes a long way in explaining the
contrasting First Amendment protections afforded both branches of the media."); see
also David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE
L. J. 213, 218 (1975).
57 But see PowE, supra note 6, at 22 ("As the [FRC] expressed in its second annual
report in 1928, '[t]he [FRC] is unable to see that the guarantee of freedom of speech has
anything to do with entertainment programs . ) (emphasis added).
See Bazelon, supra note 56, at 220 ("The fact that the telecommunications industry
still relies heavily on entertainment programming does not mean it is any less a part of
[the] independent journalistic institution the First Amendment protects.").
" Id. at 219 (At first, broadcasting "was not considered a source of serious
journalism; it was... simply a rebroadcast of information and opinions obtained from
the print media.").
o See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 20.
6j See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 56, at 219-20 (arguing that broadcasting was
perceived as a "mere conduit of news," not as a "main source of information for the
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The perception that broadcasting was an entertainment-
oriented medium was in contrast to the perception of print as news-
oriented. 6" Although entertainment programming is somewhat
protected, it has never been considered to be at the core of the First
Amendment.6" Thus, to classify broadcasting as primarily
entertainment-oriented is to fail to recognize that the broadcast
medium has become a major source of contemporary news and
commentary.66  So, while some still see the broadcast medium as
different from that of print and thus, undeserving of the same
constitutional protections, that perception has no strong factual
basis. 7  The broadcast medium has become an important core
component of the press and perceived differences between it and the
print medium are not of constitutional relevance.68
The protection offered the traditional press by the First
Amendment ensures that the government cannot limit public
accessibility to information.69 So why should the government have
a say as to what information is accessible to the public when that
information is transmitted over the airwaves? Traditionally, there
have been three distinctions recognized that have served to justify the
lesser degree of constitutional protection afforded broadcasters: 1) the
scarcity of the broadcast spectrum; 2) broadcasting's high level of
64 Id.
6 Id. at 219.
6 See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'i Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116 (1973)
("[Broadcasting has become] a vital part of our system of communication [and has
become] a major factor in the dissemination of ideas and information."); Brandywine-
Maine Line Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 473 F.2d. 16, 42 (1972) ("We are shifting our
emphasis from the printed media to the electronic media [to obtain information].").
67 See generally Bollinger, supra note 56 (arguing that although broadcasting is seen
by society as different from print, it should be given the same First Amendment
treatment).
' Id. at 2 ("The Court should now acknowledge that for First Amendment purposes
broadcasting is not fundamentally different from the print media.").
' See, e.g., Bollinger, supra note 56, at 20 ("It has rightly been thought necessary
to maintain a firm line against governmental intrusion . . . into freedom of [the]
press.").
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concentration and the purported special impact on its audience; and
3) the public ownership of the airwaves.7"
Unlike newspapers, radio broadcasters are regulated by
Congress and the FCC.71 The FCC is an administrative agency
authorized by Congress to determine, pursuant to the Federal
Communications Act [hereinafter the Act],72 the rights of the people
to have the best possible radio service.73 As an administrative body,
the FCC must find the whole of its powers within the compass of
70 See Cordoba, supra note 9, at 651-54; see also Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10,
at 336. The FCC has, on occasion, relied on another justification, the nuisance
rationale. The Supreme Court in Pacifica found that the nuisance analysis allows speech
otherwise protected by the First Amendment to be, subject to reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions in order to advance a substantial government interest. Id.
7' 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988).
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States . . . there is created
a commission to be known as the "Federal Communications
Commission" section 154 (i). The Commission may perform any
and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders,
not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions.
Id.; see also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 696 (1979) (finding that in
enacting this chapter, Congress meant to confer broad authority on the FCC so as to
maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of
radio transmission).
72 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988).
73 See, e.g., ABC v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492, 498 (1951) (finding that the purpose of
Congress in establishing the FCC was to set up an expert agency capable of coping with
the ever-changing and constantly increasing problems of a booming industry); see also
Jeffrey S. Hurwitz, Teletext and the FCC: Turning the Content Regulatory Clock
Backwards, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1057, 1065 n.43 (1984). Regulation of the broadcasting
industry formally began in 1921 when the Department of Commerce-acting pursuant
to its authority under the Radio Act of 1912-began to issue broadcast licenses. As the
number of stations grew, interference became a problem as several stations attempted
to use the same wavelength in the same city at the same time. Congress responded to
the chaos by enacting the Radio Act of 1927, which created the FRC and gave it a broad
range of powers, including the authority to issue, renew, and modify broadcast licenses
if the "public interest, convenience or necessity" would thereby be served. Seven years
later Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq, which
centralized the regulation of the telephone, telegraph, and broadcasting industries. This
Act repealed the 1927 Act and replaced the FRC with the FCC. Id.
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authority given to it by Congress.74 However, as long as it complies
with the mandate of the statute, it has wide discretion in determining
questions of both public and procedural policy."
The powers of the FCC are not limited to the engineering and
technical aspects of the regulation of radio communication.76
Accordingly, the Act does not restrict the FCC merely to supervision
of radio traffic, but also permits it to determine the composition of
7" See, e.g., WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623, rev'd on other grounds, FCC v.
WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 233 (1946).
The Congress of the United States, which has plenary power to
regulate the radio industry, has designated the FCC its administrative
agent, because it desired to have the regulatory work done by
technically trained experts, skilled and experienced in the technical
duties or radio regulations. The Congress defined the scope of the
authority of its agent or ... it established the standard according to
which the agent should act. The . broad scope of
authority . .. established by [the Act] is that the public interest,
convenience and necessity must be served. Within that framework
the administrative agent is free to exercise its expert judgment; it
cannot act unconstitutionally ... and the stream cannot rise higher
than the source; it must proceed within the scope of authority
granted to it . . . .[I]t must observe the standard established and it
cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously.
Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
I See, e.g., Ward v. FCC, 108 F.2d 486, 491 (1939) ("So long as the Commission
complies with the mandate of the statute it has, and should have, wide discretion in
determining questions both of public policy and of procedural policy, and in making and
applying appropriate rules therefor."); cf. WOKO, 153 F.2d at 628.
The broad sweep of power given to the administrative agent to
proceed according to a standard which necessarily is expressed in
very general and widely inclusive terms proves how . . . radio
station licensees must be protected from the arbitrary action of the
[FCC] in the exercise of its regulatory power.
Id. (emphasis added).
76 See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
The Commission, in discharge of its duty to promote the public
convenience, interest, or necessity, must distribute available wave-
lengths so as to give the greatest possible service, and must see to it
that all applicants for licenses have the necessary technical ability to
broadcast programs, that stations are properly constructed and
manned, and do not interfere with other stations, and that all
licensees are responsible, morally and financially.
Id. (emphasis added).
360 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. [Vol. XII
that traffic." The FCC's authority over licensees is limited only in
respect to programming decisions.78 A broadcaster's choice of
programs rests entirely upon the licensee.79
Each licensee has the duty of determining what programs will
be broadcast over their individual station's facilities and, as a result,
they are individually responsible for all program choices."0 While
this responsibility can be likened to the print media's theory of
absolute editorial discretion, a broadcaster's freedom to determine
what programs will be aired is not nearly as absolute. Although
censorship by the FCC is prohibited under the Act," a licensee's use
of the broadcast spectrum (including program selection) is subject to
review by the FCC with the paramount considerations being public
convenience, interest, and necessity.82 Consequently, programming
decisions are reviewed to determine whether the broadcaster has been
acting in accord with the "public interest."83
77 Id.
' See, e.g., Mass. Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d
497, 500 (1st Cir. 1950) ("The licensee has the duty of determining what broadcasts
shall be broadcast over his station's facilities, and cannot lawfully delegate this
duty ...... (citing FCC Report on Chain Broadcasting Regulations, May 2, 1941,
quoted in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 205 (1943))).
79id.
8od.
81 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988) states in relevant part:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the
[FCC] the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the [FCC] which shall
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
Id.
47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988) states in relevant part: "The [FCC], if public
convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of
this Act, shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this Act."
Id.; see also Regents of Univ. System of Georgia v. Carroll, 388 U.S. 586 (1950) ("In
an action on licensees, the FCC is to be guided by what we have called the 'touchstone'
of the 'public convenience, interest or necessity."').
8 See, e.g., KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc., v. Federal Radio Comm'n., 47 F.2d
670, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (explaining that the plaintiff's radio show which was
"inimical to the public health and safety" did not qualify as being in the public interest).
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The enforcement of the Act and the development of the
concept of "public interest" under the Act are entrusted primarily to
the FCC.4 Hence, the FCC's functions are both regulatory and
quasi-judicial; 5 its regulatory powers are centered around the grant
of licenses,' 6 and its judicial powers are. limited to the refusal or
revocation of a license to enforce its decisions.87 The sole function
of a court is to review or enforce the FCC's decisions.88 However,
See Mass. Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 500
(1st Cir. 1950).
'8 See generally NBC v. FCC, 319 U.S. 239 (1942); L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170
F.2d 793, 802 (1948) (finding that the [FCC], though not strictly a court, has "quasi-
judicial" powers and thus its proceedings must satisfy due process).
8' 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) which states in relevant part:
It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to maintain the control of the
United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to
provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof,
by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by
Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create
any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
Id. (emphasis added); see also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474
(1940) (finding that the fundamental purpose of Congress in respect to radio broadcasting
was the allocation and regulation of radio frequencies by prohibiting use except under
license).
'7 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1988)-Administrative Sanctions. This section lists the various
circumstances in which a broadcaster's license may be revoked and includes a revocation
procedure for a violation of, among others, section 1464 of Title 18-the prohibition
against broadcasting obscene language. Id.; cf. Regents of Univ. System of Georgia v.
Carroll, 338 U.S. 586, 596 (1950) ("[Nlothing in the power granted to the
[FCC] . . . gives to the [FCC] the power and authority to regulate the private contracts
and business of those operating radio broadcasting stations.").
9' 47 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)-Enforcement provisions:
a) Jurisdiction
The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction . . . to issue a writ or writs of
mandamus commanding such person to comply
with the provisions of this chapter.
b) Orders of [FCC]
If any person fails or neglects to obey any order
of the [FCC] other than for the payment of
money . . . the [FCC] . . . may apply to the
appropriate district court of the United States for
the enforcement of such order.
c) Duty to prosecute
Upon the request of the [FCC] it shall be the
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rather than review FCC regulations for violations of the freedom of
speech or of the press, the Supreme Court has consistently deferred
to the FCC commissioners when considering the level of
constitutional protection to be afforded the electronic media.8 9
Broadcasting and: print are not fundamentally different.'
However, as noted earlier, in the attempt to distinguish the
broadcasting medium from the print medium, the Court has
traditionally pointed to one of three supposed justifications for
regulating the flow of information over the airwaves. 91 However,
an analysis of these justifications reveals an inherent weakness in
each.
duty of any United States attorney to whom the
[FCC] may apply to institute in the proper court
and to prosecute . . . all necessary proceedings
for the enforcement of the provisions of this
chapter and for the punishment of all violations
thereof ....
Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1988)-Judicial Review:
b) Right to Appeal
Appeals may be taken from decisions and orders
of the [FCC] to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ....
Id. See also Nelson v. Leighton, 82 F. Supp. 661, 667 (N.D.N.Y. 1949) (holding that
the FCC is the proper forum before which to institute proceedings concerning alleged
violations of the Act).
89 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973), which states:
Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in the
broadcast media and determining what best serves the public's right
to be informed is a task of a great delicacy and difficulty. The
process must necessarily be undertaken within the framework of the.
regulatory scheme that has evolved over the course of the past half
century. For during that time, Congress and its chosen regulatory
agency have established a delicately balanced system of regulation
intended to serve the interests of all concerned.
Id.; see also WOKO, 153 F.2d. at 628.
0 See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 2.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.
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1. The Scarcity of the Broadcast Spectrum
In broadcasting, unlike the print media, the principal
impediment to free expression arises from the medium's physical
characteristic; the radio spectrum is finite.92 Therefore, only a
limited number of stations can operate at a given time and place
without producing interference.93 This technical reality has been
recognized by the courts and has been termed the "scarcity
doctrine.,"9 Accordingly, courts have long utilized the "scarcity
doctrine" as a means to justify Congress' power to regulate the
airwaves. 95
The "scarcity doctrine" was announced by a unanimous
Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC. 96 In Red Lion,
the Court set forth the theory that broadcasting is a "unique
medium"' which requires distinctive First Amendment analysis.
Thus, by pointing to the scarcity doctrine, the Red Lion Court was
able to distinguish between the broadcasters' First Amendment
position and the print media's, and held that because not all
persons possessing similar rights would have access to the
airwaves, broadcasting need not be recognized as "the press"
intended for protection under the First Amendment:9"
It is idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment
right to broadcasting comparable to the right of
every individual to speak, write or publish. If 100
persons want broadcast licenses but, there are only
SSee, e.g., NBC v. FCC, 319 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1942) (finding that because of
the scarcity of the radio spectrum, the licensing system established under the Act did not
violate the First Amendment). But see infra notes 150-52.
But see R. H. Coase, The FCC, 2 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1959) (rejecting the scarcity
argument).
9' See NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.
9 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
("Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put
restraints on licensees .... .
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
97 Id. at 390.
9 See id. at 388-89.
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10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the
same 'right' to a license; but if there is to be any
effective communication . . . only a few can be
licensed .. . .
This opinion develops the idea that when the channels of
communication are effectively controlled by a few interests, the
attendant risk is that of exclusion of other voices and, therefore,
a frustration of First Amendment goals.I°°
The constitutional principles discussed in Red Lion are an
elaboration of the original "scarcity doctrine" first articulated by
Justice Frankfurter in NBC v. United States. 10' Frankfurter argued
that because radio was "inherently... not available to all," it
was "unique" and therefore "subject to government regulation."'M°
This has been heralded as the "classic statement" of the
99 Id.
'o id. at 389.
It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and
furthering communications, prevented the [g]overnment from making
radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and
by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the
spectrum. ... . No one has a First Amendment right to a license or
to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license because
"the public interest" requires it "is not a denial of free speech."
Id. (citing NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943)); see also Bollinger, supra
note 56, at 6:
The marketplace theme as developed in Red Lion states that
when . . . the channels of communication are effectively controlled
by a few interests, there is the risk that many important voices will
be excluded and that, as a consequence, the public will be seriously
hampered in its efforts to conduct its affairs wisely. Unless the
government intervenes to insure the widespread availability of
opportunities for expression within the mass media, the objectives of
the [Flirst [A]mendment may be frustrated.
Id.
'0' 319 U.S. 190, 216-26 (1943).
102 id.
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justification for government regulation in broadcasting." °
However, it.maintains little relevance today." -
The: "scarcity doctrine" has increasingly been criticized as
unpersuasive and obsolete. 5 Even former FCC Chairman Mark
Fowler has challenged the "scarcity doctrine" as a "false and
artificial justification for broadcast media regulation."" While
writers in the field have theorized that the "scarcity doctrine" is
obsolete considering the great advances in relevant technology,
107
the availability of alternative communications systems has
increased competition in the marketplace and the scarcity
justification has been consequently diluted.'0 8
The technological.developments referred to by these critics
existed at the time of Red Lion, yet they were not accepted by the
Court as a reason for extending constitutional protection." 9 The
broadcasters in Red Lion urged the Court to realize that although
there may have been technological scarcity at one time, the
situation had significantly changed."t 0 The Court, however, did
not agree, stating that "[s]carcity is not entirely a thing of the
past" and claiming that although "[a]dvances in
technology . . . have led to more efficient utilization of the
frequency spectrum, . . . uses forthat spectrum have also grown
.103 See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 7 n.21.
104 See Cordoba, supra note 9, at 653. "The availability of alternative
communications systems such as cable television, multichannel multipoint distribution
service, satellite master antenna systems, and home videocassette recorders not only
increases broadcasters' competition in the marketplace, but also serves to dilute scarcity
as a justification for broadcast regulation." Id.
" Id. "The Doctrine's critics primarily emphasize that although demand for new
stations far exceeds the supply of frequencies, modern communications technologies
make the doctrine obsolete." Id.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Bollinger, supra note 56, at 2 ("[The Court's attempt to distinguish
broadcasting on the basis of its dependence on a scarce resource (the electromagnetic
spectrum) is unpersuasive . whatever validity the distinction may once have had is
now being undercut by the advance of new technology.").
See Cordoba, supra note 9, at 653.
109 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396-97.
0 Id. at 396.
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apace.""' However, the prediction that the new found access
would be consistently met by the demand did not prove correct:
"[t]he development of the UHF (ultra high frequency) portion of
the spectrum had greatly expanded the total number of available
channels, and when the [Red Lion] Court considered the issue, a
significant number were (and continue to be) unused.""'
Additionally, the constantly expanding cable technology brings
with it the possibility of an unlimited number of broadcast
outlets." 3 Therefore, the only concept of scarcity that remains
significant in the broadcasting industry today is economic
scarcity. 14  However, economic scarcity cannot- justify the
imposition of content-based regulations on either the print or
broadcast medium." 5  Furthermore, assuming that physical
scarcity has remained constant in the broadcast medium, it does
not legitimize government interference with program content.
1 6
Physical scarcity can justify content-based restrictions on speech
only if a connection can be made between the problem (physical
scarcity), and the solution (broadcaster's duty not to air certain
types of programs or speech), which does not exist for the print
I ld. at 396-97.
222 See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 8 (emphasis added).
'"See Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75-76 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) "But Red Lion cannot be read as the final word
on scarcity: the cable technology of the future was not even mentioned in the Court's
decision." Id. at 75.
114 Id. at 75 n.56.
It appears today that economic, not technical, limitations in reality
restrict entry into the broadcast market. And as to these, "the
economic barriers to entry into radio broadcasting are . . . far less
restrictive than in the case of media such as newspapers." But of
course, the economic basis of scarcity does not yet justify regulation
of the content of printed press ....
Id. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (citing Glen 0. Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment, Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN.
L. REv. 67, 88 (1967)).
' See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 12-13 (1976). "An effort by government to eliminate differences based on
economic disparities is an infinitely more complex and far-reaching problem than an
attempt to allocate facilities in a shortage situation." Id. at 12.
16 See Coyne, supra note 51, at 580.
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media as well." 7 If no such connection exists, scarcity can be
used to solve the problems of technical limitations only."'
However, proponents of content regulation have failed to establish
this connection, and it should be recognized that this justification
can no longer be advanced." 9
2. Audience Impact
The second distinction recognized by the Court in
upholding content regulation is the greater impact effected on the
public by the broadcast media in comparison to the print media. 20
This distinction has been noted by the Court in several cases.'
The proponents of the "impact rationale" contend that
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75 (D.C. Cir.
1972):
Today, our fears of a broadcasting monopoly seem dated. The
number of commercial broadcasting stations on the air as of
September 1972, was 7,458. As of January 1, 1971, daily
newspapers totaled only 1,749. Nearly every American city receives
a number of different television and radio signals. Radio licensees
represent diverse ownership; UHF, local, and public broadcasting
offer contrast to the three competing networks; neither broadcasting
spectrum is completely filled. But out of 1,400 newspaper cities,
there are only fifteen left with face-to-face competition.
Id. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 657 (1970) (In questioning Frankfurter's opinion in NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), the author stated "[ilt did not explain why the
scarcity factor eliminated First Amendment issues, [or] other questions that lurked in the
problem.").
'2 See, e.g., David L. Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of
the Mass Media.: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1973). But see
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
vacated, reh 'g granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting the "captive
audience" rationale).
121 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973) ("The [FCC]
is . . . entitled to take into account the reality that in a very real sense listeners and
viewers constitute a captive audience.") (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted);
Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, 473 F.2d. at 79 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). "There is
no doubt about the unique impact of radio and television." Id. But see Action, 11 F.3d
at 175-76 (rejecting the "captive audience" rationale).
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broadcasting has a unique and powerful effect on our lives and,
therefore, must be kept in close check.'2
However, like the "scarcity doctrine," audience impact
alone cannot be used to justify governmental imposition of
content-based restrictions. 3  The impact theory is a weak and
unstructured justification for regulation. 4 The impact theory's
unstructured nature allows for regulations which are not clearly
related to specific governmental interests, and threatens that
censorship of a message may be more acceptable when the
message reaches more people. 2 Thus, accepting the "impact
rationale" to justify government regulation of content is completely
contrary to our First Amendment traditions of protecting freedom
of the press.' 26 A medium without an "impact" is ineffective and,
as such, would not require protection.'27
Nevertheless, even if this "impact" theory were to be
accepted, it is clearly erroneous as applied to radio. 2  Radio has.
' See Bazelon, supra note 56, at 220-21 ("[Rladio offer[sl access to immense
numbers of listeners with at least part of the immediacy of person-to-person
communications. This all-pervasive immediate form of press commentary gives
tremendous leverage to speakers who have access to it.").(emphasis added). But see
Roscoe L. Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting, 37
U. CIN. L. REv. 447, 490-92 (1968) (stating that although radio has a significant impact
on our lives, it is not as powerful a medium as television). Id.
"z See Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, 473 F.2d at 79 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
124 See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 13-16. "mhe impact thesis is a dangerously
amorphous justification for regulation. It provides no clear limits to official authority
and invites censorship as well as affirmative regulation." Id. at 15.
" Id. ("[I1n so far as this thesis rests upon the premise that regulation is more
acceptable the greater the audience and the impact, it seems inconsistent with the
underlying purpose of the First Amendment, which presumably is to protect effective as
well as ineffective speech.").
"2 See, e.g., .Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, 473 F.2d. at 79 (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting). "[W]e should recall that the printed press was the only medium of mass
communication in the early days of the Republic-and yet this did not deter our
predecessors from passing the First Amendment to prohibit abridgement of its
freedoms." Id.
"27 Id. at 78-79 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) "To argue that a more effective press
requires a more regulated press flies in the face of what history has taught us about the
values and purposes of protecting the individual's freedom of speech." Id. at 79.
" See POWE, supra note 6, at 165.
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evolved into a diversity of formats whereby stations are not
attempting to reach every audience; 129 rather, radio broadcasters
try to find their niche and program to a limited audience.130 As a
result, radio reflects the diversity of American society.'
Therefore, questions regarding the appropriateness of content-
based regulations for radio, as opposed to television, raise some
important issues as to what the public is being protected against.
For example, "[b]ecause radio is not pictoral, graphic portrayals
of sex and violence are impossible." 1 2  However, due to its
diversity, "radio is vastly more likely to vary its programming
from any mainstream norm."' Thus, while complaints have
occasionally surfaced regarding the use of "bad" language on
television, it has been radio that has been "the action arena" when
the issue is offensive progra'ming."m Historically, the FCC has
reacted more often and more harshly to radio licensees than to
television broadcasters.' However, the existence of a restrictive
attitude towards offensive programming on radio was made quite
clear by the FCC when it actually denounced certain rock songs
as promoting the use of drugs."3 6
As noted, the problem with the "impact rationale" is that
due to the diversity of radio, any attempt to restrict radio
programming because of its content raises questions of whether the





'"See PowE, supra note 6, at 165.
134 Id.
135 Id. (stating that radio, which appeals to diverse audiences, often departs from the
mainstream norm, thereby requiring more monitoring by the FCC).
'36 Id. at 177. In 1971, "the [FCC] moved into action in an attempt to ban 'drug
lyrics' from the air." In a notice to licensees, the FCC issued a list of 22 songs
containing so-called drug-oriented lyrics, resulting in an industry-wide ban of a number
of very popular songs. The Beatles lost 4Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" and "With
a Little Help from My Friends." Amazingly enough, this official "do not play" list also
included a children's song, "Puff the Magic Dragon" by Peter, Paul and Mary. Id. at
179-80.
A mA
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view.'37 The economics of radio force licensees to target their
prospective audiences and present programming that appeals to.a
certain group;138 therefore, radio cannot maintain a standard as
"homogenous" as television and survive. 139  As a result, "the
[FCC] has been faced with the issue of how much deviation from
consensus morality would be tolerated in radio broadcasts" and
have regulated with this issue in mind. 40 Consequently, the use
of the "impact rationale" for justifying content-based regulations
has the qualities of censorship. 4'
3. Public Ownership of the Airwaves
The third rationale used to justify content regulation of the
broadcasting medium is the "public ownership" theory.'42 This
theory rests on the notion that the airwaves are public property
and therefore can be regulated,for the public good. 43 This is the
reasoning behind the Act's licensing scheme and reflects the
decision made by the government that the "public interest" would
best be served through a series of private broadcasters licensed to
operate for a limited time.0
Proponents of this rationale emphasize that a license to
broadcast is neither a constitutional right nor a property interest.14'
"3 id. at 165.
' See POWE, supra note 6, at 165.
139 Id. For example, men between the ages of 18 and 34 are a primary target for
many contemporary rock stations. See Steve Hall, Schedule Spat Knocks Bayh Off
WTHR, INDiANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 5, 1995, at C7.
'40 See POWE, supra note 6, at.165.
... Id. at 165-66; see also Bollinger, supra note 56, at 15.
142 See Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d. 16, 67 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) ("[lt, is often stated as a foregone conclusion that a
broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of duty ... .
I43 d. at 68 n.21 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) ("Broadcast regulation has, from its
inception, been based on the premise that the airwaves belong to the people . .
Id.
14S ee Robinson,.supra note 114, at 72, 136-44 (The First Amendment does not
forbid the FCC from imposing such limits as the "fairness doctrine" and "equal time"
upon licensees; the FCC retains control over the radio spectrum by requiring that
licenses be renewed every three years).
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Broadcasters are granted the temporary use of "this valuable
resource;" 4 6 however, "ownership and ultimate control remain
vested in the people of the United States." 47 Therefore, the
government, as public trustee, has the authority to regulate its
use. 1
48
This argument, however, fails to consider the fact that
although the government many claim "ownership" to a place or a
thing, the fundamental right of free, speech is still protected.
49
The government cannot limit First Amendment freedoms simply
because it is the owner of a place or a thing.50 Further, some
critics warn that accepting the "public ownership" theory would
require accepting regulations on speech uttered on public-owned
'4 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) which provides in relevant part:
It is the purpose of this chapter . .. to maintain the control of the
Unites States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to
provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof,
by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by
Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create




149 See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951).
's See Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, Inc v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
[G]overnment might claim owneiship'of the airwaves, just as it has
claimed ownership of parks and streets and postal facilities, for the
public good. But it'cannot, unlike a private owner, place restraints
upon the First Amendment rights of those who use this property
simply by declaring "I own it." The'very fact of public ownership
or control brings into play the First Amendment, which requires that
governmental authority may not be used in and of itself to justify
deprivation of freedoms of speech and press. Were it otherwise,
these constitutional protection would fall to the caprice of
governments.
Id. (emphasis added).
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lands, such as municipal streets and parks;"' others question the
government's claim of "ownership" over an intangible object."'
As noted above, the traditional justifications for content-
based regulation of broadcast speech-the "scarcity doctrine," the
"impact rationale," and the "public ownership" theory-do not
independently provide a sufficient basis on which to diminish First
Amendment principles."' So why have they been accepted, as
authority to restrict the information available over the airwaves?"
Perhaps this demonstrates that the majority does not truly want a
press that is "free";,' a press that is "free" might prove
dangerous. 116
Fear of an unregulated press is understandable.
15 7
However, if the alternative is a regulatory scheme that limits the
1 See Emerson, supra note 115, at 13.
3 See Robinson, supra note 114, at 152-53 ("To say that the airways or spectrum
can be owned by anyone is simply to indulge in fantasy. Surely no one seriously
supposes that the airways are a thing of nature that can be occupied or used in any
normal sense of the word."). See also Brandywine Maine-Line Radio, 473 F.2d at 68
n.21 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting):
The "spectrum" is a purely artificial construct of the [FCC] itself.
To give this construct an independent nature and then attempt to
justify the regulation itself in those terms is entirely circular. It is
like saying that the [FCC] owns the frequencies because it has the
power to regulate their use, and that it has the power to regulate
their use because it owns them.
153 See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 56, at 234. "[W]hen all these justifications
[spectrum scarcity, audience impact, public ownership] are shaken down . . . they all
demonstrate mostly the fragility of our First Amendment traditions." Id.
" See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90, 396-
400 (1969) (scarcity doctrine); CBS v. D3emocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127
(1973) (impact doctrine); Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, 473 F.2d at 67 (public
ownership doctrine) (Bazelon, C.J. dissenting).
"s Bazelon, supra note 56, at 234. "Somehow we do not really think that the press
should be free; they are too powerful, theyare arbitrary, they are self-serving." Id.; see
also POWE, supra note 36, at 290. "As long as concentration of the media keeps
increasing, their power will appear to be increasing, and there will be discussions of
potential regulation." Id.
Cs6 f POWE, supra note 36, at 289. "Concentrations of power, whether big
oil . . . big labor . . . or big media, leave Americans uneasy." Id.
157 See POWE, supra note 36, at 290 ("The right-freedom of the press-offers, in
its modem manifestation, the potential of power.").
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flow of information to only that which is morally suitable, an
.equal danger exists.158  Our history has taught us that society
should not accept a government that controls the type of
information that flows through the media.'59 "Freedom of the
press is guaranteed, not for the benefit of reporters,;" but rather,
"it is for the benefit of the listeners and viewers and readers. The
cause is America." ,
60
Ill. Shifting the Balance of
First Amendment Freedoms
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
law".. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. "161
However, does the First Amendment allow room for
interpretation? Some have argued that it does not; the language is
S Id. at 296 ("[F]reedom of the press has proven to be a guarantor of civil
liberties .... The examples of less democratic countries with their controlled
newspapers present a powerful reinforcement of the idea that America has been doing
something right for a long time.").
s Id. at 297. "Justice Jackson wrote that the 'very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to place certain subjects beyond the reach of majorities .... One's right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections."' Id. (citing West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
A powerful and privileged press checking a popularly elected and
powerful government creates tensions that cannot be removed
without compromising press autonomy. When the press performs at
its best, exemplified by The Washington Post during Watergate, it
will face not only an angry government but substantial numbers of
angry citizens as well.
Id. at 293.
'6oId. at 289 (citing T. Bethell and C. Peters, The Imperial Press, WASH.
MONTHLY, Nov. 1976, at 28, 29); see also MATTHEW L. SPITzER, SEVEN DIRTY
WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES: CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND
BROADCAST 45 (1986) ("Freedom of speech and press are prized because they inform
the electorate within a democracy and help to produce, through the 'marketplace of
ideas,' useful ideas for the improvement of society, scientific advancement, and so
forth.").
161 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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absolute.162 These scholars have concluded that the federal
government is without any power whatsoever under the
Constitution to put any type of burden on speech and expression
of ideas of any kind. 63 But, this view has been dismissed as
impractical and thus never fully accepted by a majority of the
Court.
162 See Brandywine-Maine Line Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 65 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihe First Amendment does not speak equivocally.
It prohibits any law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."); see also
Emerson, supra note 115, at 17:
"Expression" must be freely allowed and encouraged. "Action" can
be controlled, subject to 6ther c6nstitutional requirements, but not by
controlling expression .... The character of the system [of freedom
of expression] can flourish, and the goals of the system can be
realized, only if expression receives full protection under the First
Amendment . ... The government may protect or advance other
social interests through regulation of action, but not by suppressing
expression.
Id.
6 .Cf Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 49i-92 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting):
mhe First Amendment allows all ideas to be expressed-whether
orthodox, popular, offbeat, or repulsive. I do not think it
permissible to draw lines between the "good" and the "bad" and be
true to the constitutional mandate to let all ideas alone. If our
Constitution permitted "reasonable" regulation of freedom of
expression, as do the constitutions of some nations, we would be in
a field where the legislative and the judiciary would have much
leeway. But under our charter all regulation or control of
expression is barred.
Id. (emphasis added).
164 See Introduction to EMERSON, supra note 44, at vii:
Proponents of the "absolute" or "literal" interpretation of the First
Amendment have failed to define the bounds of their position or to
account for such apparent exceptions to the absolute test as the law
of libel, the application of child labor laws to the distribution of
literature, and the regulation of election campaigns. Their views
have therefore been dismissed as impractical or illogical, or both.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that restricting speech
because of its message is unconstitutional.165 Yet, this principle
seems to have been ignored in many situations.t66 It has become
clear that an abridgment of speech is not, despite the apparently
unqualified language of the First Amendment, necessarily
unconstitutional.167 This is especially true in the broadcast arena
where the Court has frequently upheld content-based restrictions
on speech. 68
Generally, two approaches are used to justify such
holdings. 69 In the first approach, some speech is categorically
excluded from First Amendment protection or is given a lesser
degree of protection.t"0 Here, the Court does not ask whether the
value of speech in a particular case outweighs the arguments for
proscribing it.'' Rather, the Court generalizes and considers the
value of the specific category of speech or category of speaker.'
16 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[Albove all
else, the First Amendment means that [the] government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
16 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 15, at 65 (citing N.Y. Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (restraint motivated by concerns of national security); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 (1976) (restriction imposed to protect fair trial rights
of defendant); Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933) (restriction may mandate use
of public airways only for public interest, necessity, and convenience); FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384 (1965) (restraint of deceptive advertising)).
'67 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 15, at 65.
60 See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
169 See CARTER, supra note 15, at 67.
170 Id.
171 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chaplinsky
established the idea that when the issue is obscenity, there is no need for a meaningful
First Amendment balancing test; "[i]t has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." Id.
72 Id. at 571-72 ("There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
constitutional problems.").
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
Speech of this nature usually includes the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous and insulting, or "fighting words."1 73
At first glance, this approach-placing entire classes of
speech outside the protective ambit of the First Amendment-gives
more guidance for future decisions than the alternative "ad hoc"
balancing approach. 74 However, the problem with definitional or
categorical balancing is the very real danger of judicial or
legislative overreaching 75
The second approach, the "ad hoc" approach, employs a
"balancing test" to determine whether the government's content
control constitutes an impermissible abridgement of freedom of
speech.176 In this type of analysis, the Court attempts to identify
the various interests, involved: the government's interest in limiting
or preventing the speech in question and the would-be speakers'
and listeners' interest in having the speech heard."7 This is a
case-by-case analysis where "the specific interests applicable to the
facts of the particular case are considered crucial." 7 8
The balancing approach, first embraced by a majority of
the Court in 1950,179 is a practical approach. It recognizes the
importance of First Amendment interests, but permits the making
of pragmatic judgments as to when those interests should prevail
over other conflicting interests. 180  However, the virtue of
practicality may also be a vice. The protection afforded by the
First Amendment is stated in absolute terms, "Congress shall
make no law .... "18 There are no provisions for restricting the
freedom of speech or freedom of the press.8 2 Nor does it propose
'id. at 572.
1 See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
'"See CARTER, supra note 15, at 68 (suggesting that the balancing process yields
varying results as the hierarchy of values accorded various interests change).
176 See CARTER, supra note 15, at 67.
rn Id.
178 Id.
'79 Id. at 71-72.
180 Id. at 67.
181 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
182 U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press.").
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that a test should be employed where other interests are in
conflict. 83 Nevertheless, the Court has decided it must take other
considerations into account and defer to the FCC when
appropriate.J4 This approach seems inconsistent with its function;
the Court's duty is to determine whether the government is
regulating unconstitutionally and therefore should not simply defer
to legislative judgment when a fundamental liberty is at stake."85
Although a basic principle of constitutional law calls upon the
courts to presume legislative enactments are constitutional, I6
important considerations have been raised which suggest that the
Court has not been adhering to the letter or the spirit of the First
Amendment."8 7
So what did the First Amendment mean to the framers?
One scholar answers, "surprisingly, unlike so many other
constitutional questions, this one can be answered with remarkable
certainty." 88 This is an absolutist view: "[t]he First Amendment
means exactly what its plain language would suggest to an
ordinary reader: Congress is completely without power to pass
laws that would abridge either freedom of speech or freedom of
183 Id.
"' See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) ("[l]t is well
understood that the r'ight of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances."); Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987) ("It has long been
held that the government may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on
speech, so long as they are narrowly tailored to further a significant government
interest." (citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 315 U.S 568, 571 (1942))).
"' See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 177 (D.C. Cir.
1993), vacated, reh 'g granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("Deference to
a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at
stake."' (quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843
(1978))).
'"See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938)
(holding that facts supporting the legislative judgment are to be presumed).
" Id. at 152 n.4 (Stone, J.) (recognizing that legislation which inhibits political
freedoms, such as the freedom of speech, must survive more "exacting judicial
scrutiny").
' See PowE, supra note 36, at 47.
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the press." 9 Although this view may seem extreme, it is
supported byhistory.'90 The prevailing opinion during the debate
on freedom of the press-from the Constitutional Convention
through ratification of the Bill of Rights-was that the federal
government did not have the authority to regulate the press.191
However, even in those days, this view was not shared by
all. The Antifederalists did not agree that the Constitution carried
such a power and were more fearful of usurpation once the
government came into operation.192 This concern was a major
factor in the Antifederalists' demand for a bill of rights which
included a press clause.' 93 Clearly, the framers may not have
envisioned the press as we know it today. However, the
underlying principles of freedom of speech and of the press should
not change merely because technology has.'9
Against a backdrop' of a continuing laissez-faire attitude
towards the press, the belief that regulation is acceptable for the
airwaves is confusing.' 95 Americans have traditionally viewed the
189 Id.; see EMERSON, supra note 44, at 59 ("The root purpose of the First
Amendment was to assure an effective system of freedom of expression in a democratic
society.").
'9 See David S. Bogen, The Orgins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD L.
REv. 429, 430 (1983) (The guarantees of the First Amendment are rooted in the
parliamentary privilege of freedom of debate, the abolition of prior censorship in
England, the theory of natural rights, the growth of religious toleration, and the limited
function of a national government in a federal system.).
191 See POWE, supra note 36, at 47 ("James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton said
forcefully and consistently that the theory of the [C]onstitution being drafted was that
there was no power granted to the federal government to pass a law dealing with the
press. ").
19 Id. at 47-48 ("When that unfortunate day occurred, the rights of the people would
be in jeopardy.").
193 id.
194 See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Super Highway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1098 (1994) ("The transient nature of
communications technologies requires that the evolution of the First Amendment be
grounded in the underlying interests that the First Amendment seeks to protect.").
195 See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 3 ("Our society has generally been committed
to the notion that, with a few narrow exceptions, the government should stay out of the
business of overseeing . . . the press.").
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press as a fourth branch of government, 96 providing a check on
the power of the other three branches: " Yet, instead of
scrutinizing laws that restrict broadcaster editorial discretion in
light of the print media cases, we have accepted broadcasting
regulations based on little more than a misguided belief that it is
a "unique medium." 98  As a result, well-established First
Amendment principles have been applied to broadcasting in only
atrophied form.' 99 The mystery is how the clear intent of the
Constitution's First Amendment, so well and so strictly enforced
in the domain of print, has been so neglected in the electronic
revolution. 00
The legal status of broadcasting was clearly defined by the
Supreme Court in the 1930's.201 During this time Trinity
Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission202 held that
broadcasting is not entitled to the full range of First Amendment
privileges that the print media enjoys. 20 3 Trinity Church was the
impetus behind the theory that since broadcasting was not the
press in the traditional sense of the word, the Court could properly
establish and identify the differences. 2 4  These differences have
196 See, e.g., POOL, supra note 1, at 11 ("Freedom of press, like free speech,
basically meant that individuals could express themselves [where as today] [plublishing
is rarely now the expression of just an individual. It is undertaken by large
organizations.").
'9 See POWE, supra note 36, at 48 ("The First Amendment was intended to be an
additional structural provision to keep the federal government within its prescribed
boundaries.").
198.See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 6 (quoting the Supreme Court in Red Lion
Broadcasting, Co. Inc., 395 U.S. 395, 390 (1969)); see also POOL, supra note 1, at 2
("On the grounds of a supposed scarcity of usable frequencies in the radio spectrum,
broadcasters are selected by the government for merit in its eyes, assigned a slice each
of the spectrum of frequencies, and required to use that assignment fairly and for
community welfare as defined by state authorities.").
'99 See POOL, supra note 1, at 2.
2'0 Id. at3.
201 See POWE, supra note 6, at 11.
202 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
2o Id. at 853. See also POWE, supra note 6, at 11.
204 See POWE, supra note 6, at 16 ("The FRC argued that broadcast speech was not
'speech' within the meaning of the First Amendment."); see also supra notes 57-70 and
accompanying text.
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been used to justify a constitutionally acceptable imbalance in the
freedoms accorded an important member of today's press. °5
IV. Regulating Morality:
The Current Status of Indecency
Perhaps the most obvious discrepancy that exists in the
constitutional status of broadcasters as compared to their print
media counterparts is in the FCC's regulation of "indecent"
material. 2" As evidenced by the Court's decision in Near v.
Minnesota, °7 regulations which impose a "public interest"-
standard over the print media are considered censorship.
20 8
However, forty years later, when the Court considered the issue
in Pacifica,2° it did not consider a "public interest" standard
imposed upon broadcasters to be in conflict with the First
Amendment.o
It is well established that suppression of speech for the
purpose of shielding listeners from ideas the majority finds
offensive is unconstitutional.21 ' Nevertheless, "indecent" material
which would be protected Under the First Amendment if heard in
a movie or seen in a magazine may be prohibited, if transmitted
over our radios.
NBC v. United States, 319 U.s. 190, 227 (1943) ("The right of free speech does
not include ... the right to use radio facilities without a license."); see also Bollinger,
supra note 56, at 20'.
o See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 13 ("The customary approach to the problem of
disparate treatment of the electronic and the print media has been to line them up side
by side and see whether there are any differences between them that justify the result.").
20 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
2 Id. at 712.
2 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
210 Id. at 748.
2n See, e.g., Michael S. Maurer, First Amendment: Regulating Embassy Picketing
in the Public Forum, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 908, 920 (1991).
212 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("[O]f all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection.").
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The reasons for the distinctions are complex.3 But the
one most frequently offered where "indecency" is the issue is that
the broadcast media has a uniquely pervasive presence in
American life and, as such, Congress allows the FCC to ensure
that this "impact" will be in the public interest.2"4 This power
allows the FCC to consider a broadcaster's past program content
and to refuse renewal to a licensee who is found to have been
airing "patently offensive" material.2"5 Thus speech, although not
obscene, may be restricted as "indecent" if found to be offensive
to the average listener.2"6 This is a standard that takes subjective
notions into account and necessarily fails torecognize the diversity
of the listening audience.
21 7
Upon re-implementation of this generic standard, the-FCC
asserted that the indecency policy was aimed at channelling the
speech in question rather than prohibiting it."'8 Stressing that
"[a] ...definitionally indecent speech would be permissible so
long as the broadcast occurred when there was no 'reasonable risk'
that children were in the audience,"219 the FCC tried to soften the
blow it had dealt the industry. However, the FCC never defined
"children" or what was meant .by "reasonable risk."220
213 See supra notes 80-140 and accompanying text.
214 See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Court in
Pacifica described radio as "an intruder in the home," "uniquely pervasive," and
"uniquely accessible to children." See also supra notes 120-41 and accompanying text.
2' id. at 735 ("The prohibition against censorship unequivocally denies the [FCC]
any power to edit proposed broadcasts in advance and to excise material considered
inappropriate for the airwaves. The prohibition, however, has never been construed to
deny the [FCC] the power to review the content of- completed broadcasts in the
performance of its regulatory duties.").
216 See Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987); see also supra text
accompanying note 29.
21T.Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
balance . . . fails to accord proper weight to the interests of listeners who wish to hear
broadcasts the FCC deems offensive."); see supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
2i8 See Public Notice, New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to all
Broadcasters and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (released Apr. 29, 1987)
[hereinafter Indecency Public Notice].
219 id.
2" See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 337.
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Consequently, this change in policy left broadcasters with vague
standards with which to assess proposed programming, which-in
effect-works to prohibit any questionable material. 2 '
Under the current indecency standard, a broadcaster is
obliged to exercise some form of self-censorship in order to ensure
license renewal.222 Thus, most broadcasters, attempting to avoid
sanction, will refrain from airing anything that may have even the
slightest appearance of offensiveness.223 As a result, the free flow
of ideas supposedly promised by the First Amendment may not be
received through our radios. 4 Speculators have even asserted that
the FCC has implied that an adult listener may not hear what
would be unfit for children unless she was listening between the
hours of midnight and six a.m.225
In response to requests for reconsideration,. the FCC
offered a more detailed explanation of how it planned to apply its
new indecency policy and identified factors to be considered by
broadcasters in making programming judgments.226 The elements
221 Id.
m See Cordoba, supra note 9, at 641.
n3 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
' See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 337 (arguing that the FCC's indecency
policy "channels" the speech in question.).
22 See PowE, supra note 6, at 209 ("The Court's opinion [in Pacifica] makes it clear
that Carlin's monologue would receive full constitutional protection if delivered in a
nightclub .... [lt is radio, not the words that triggers concern."). But see All Things
Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 24, 1993). The day after the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11
F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, reh'g granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en
bane), struck down the six a.m. to midnight ban as unconstitutional, the FCC released
a written statement. FCC Interim Chairman James Quiello said that the agency will
continue to prohibit indecency although not for as many hours. The FCC would now
limit its enforcement of the ban to the hours of six a.m. to eight p.m. Id. Timothy
Dike' the attorney who represented the broadcasters in the case, argued that this policy
is inconsistent with the court's ruling. Id.
226 See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 342-43 n.80.
The new standard required broadcasters to determine by a
compounding series of guesses: 1) the identity of the mythical
"children" whose sensibilities were to be protected; 2) the identity
of the mythical average listeners ... whose values determined what
material was unsuitable for children; and 3) the predilections of then-
sitting commissioners who determined the average American's view
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identified by the FCC included the "vulgar" or "shocking" nature
of the words, the "manner" in which the language was presented,
whether the offensive material was isolated or fleeting, and
whether there was a "reasonable risk" that children were in the
audience.227 However, when requested, the FCC refused to issue
a ruling on a proposed broadcast program, choosing not to make
editorial judgments for the licensee.228 Ironically, the FCC was
concerned with the propriety of such an action, and would leave
it up to the individual broadcaster to determine the risks involved
in airing questionable material.229
FCC determinations of indecency inherently involve
judgments based on morality.23 As pointed out by Justice
Brennan's dissent in Pacifica, the FCC's indecency statute
"permits majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a protected
message from entering the homes of a receptive, unoffended
minority."2 3' Apparently, the Court and the FCC have forgotten
that listening to a radio program is a matter of choice; at all times
the listener maintains the ability to tune out.2 32  Occasionally, a
of what was suitable for the average child.
Id.
'27 Id. at 342.
mId.
9 See, e.g., Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 337-41. One of the broadcasters
sanctioned by the three decisions, Pacifica Foundation [hereinafter the Foundation]
questioned whether the FCC's new policy would prohibit a "Bloomsday" reading from
James Joyce's ULYSSES planned to be aired the following month over their New York
station, WBAI. Id. The Foundation petitioned the FCC for a declaratory ruling, stating
that the work to be broadcast had "substantial literary and cultural value,"
notwithstanding the work's "dirty words." Id. The FCC, however, declined the
invitation, stating that "[als a general matter because of the First Amendment
considerations that are involved, the [FCC] must be especially cautious in exercising its
authority . . . with respect to program content prior to broadcast." Id. The FCC left
the Foundation to make its own judgment and WBAI broadcasted the piece as planned.
Id.
'0 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978) (noting that the definition
of "indecent" refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality).
z' Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 765-66.
Whatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who
inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive during the brief
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
listener may be confronted with an undesirable broadcast, but
"[o]ccasional exposure to offensive material in scheduled
programming is of roughly the same order that confronts the
reader browsing in a bookstore. 233
The FCC's current position clearly indicates that it has,
deemed it more important to protect certain listeners who might be
offended by certain programming, such as children and parents,
than to protect those adult listeners who would not.." However,
prioritizing the interests of listeners is not a valid position for the
FCC to take; "[t]he First Amendment protects the rights of all
listeners and viewers-not just of that part of the audience whose
listening and viewing habits meet with government approval."235
The competing interests identified in this debate are: 1) the
government, which has a compelling interest in protecting children
from indecent material; 2) parents, who are entitled to decide
whether their children are exposed to such material if it is aired;
3) broadcasters, who are entitled to air such material at times of
the day when children are not likely to be in the audience; and 4)
adult listeners, who have a right to see and hear programming that
is inappropriate for children but is not obscene. 36 In contrast, the
FCC has invoked three goals as justification for its indecency
policy, none of which accords the proper weight to the competing
interests, and, as such, cannot be accepted as legitimate
government interests.237
interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch stations or
flick the "off" button, it is surely worth . . . to preserve the
broadcasters right to send,'and the right of those interested to receive
a message entitled to full First Amendment protection.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
' Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d. 170, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
vacated, reh'g granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
' See Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 390 (1969) (holding that
the right of listener is paramount to the right of the broadcaster).
"3 Action, 11 F.3d. at 175.
3'6 See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 351 (citing Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
237 See Action, 11 F.3d. at 173.
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The FCC claims that the indecency policyis aimed at; 1)
"ensuring that parents have an opportunity to supervise their
children's listening and viewing of over-the-air broadcasts," 2)
"ensuring the well being of minors" regardless of parental
supervision, and 3) "protecting the right, of all members of the
public to be free of indecent material in the privacy of their
homes."23' The first two goals, regarding the welfare of children,
have been accepted as compelling interests.2 39 However, the third
goal, protecting the general public, has been found to be
insufficient to support a restriction on the broadcasting of
constitutionally protected "indecent" material.4
Moreover, as a regulation that infringes upon a
fundamental right, the indecency statute must also be able to
satisfy strict scrutiny.24  Therefore, in addition to advancing a
compelling interest, the government must demonstrate that the
regulation is narrowly tailored; a duty the government has




24°Id. The court refused to recognize "any generalized government interest in
protecting adults from indecent speech, primarily because the official suppression of
constitutionally protected speech runs counter to the fundamental principle of the First
Amendment." Id. at 175.
24' See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978). The Court
recognized that for the government to legitimately regulate speech, the restriction must
be able to survive a strict scrutiny test. Thus, it must be content-neutral and narrowly
drawn to further a substantial government interest. The Court further noted that unless
there were alternative channels for communication of the restricted information, the
regulation would not survive the test. Id.
242 See Action, 11 F.3d at 171 ("The FCC and Congress have failed to tailor their
efforts to advance these interests in a sufficiently narrow way."); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d. 1504, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d. 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This series of cases
involved a coalition of broadcast networks and associations who challenged the FCC's
delineation of the "safe-harbor" zone. However, the only Action decision discussed in
this Note is the 1993 decision by the DC. Circuit; "the third time the court . . . has
invalidated the existing scheme of FCC indecency regulation." See All Things
Considered: Court Defeats FCC Attempt to Limit Broadcast Indecency (National Public
Radio, Nov. 24, 1993) (statement of Timothy Dike).
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In Pacifica, the Supreme Court recognized that because
licensees cannot target their audiences, they are powerless to
shield children from hearing broadcasts intended for adults without
also denying access to adults for such programs.243 However, the
Court also acknowledged that parents are unable to control
everything their children might hear over the airwaves. 2"
Consequently, the Pacifica Court determined that the government
must aid the parent in protecting the child from offensive
material.245 It concluded that the only way to preclude minors'
access was to restrict the material at its source.
246
This analysis is problematic. The theory of the Court
seems to be that because children can listen to the radio without
trouble or supervision, content regulations are appropriate.247
However, this rationale does not support a distinction between a
child's access to radio and access to a newspaper. 24 Nor does it
explain why responsibility for access should rest with the
government. 249  Just like the newspaper, parents bring the radio
into their home voluntarily. 2 ° As such, responsibility for its use
should remain with the parent rather than with the government.
243 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. Contra supra notes 128-34 and accompanying
text (discussing the fact that the radio broadcasters target their audiences).
244 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
245 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968)).
2' Id. at 749-50; see also Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (acknowledging that the
government has the right to make rules promoting minors' well-being).
247 But see Action, 11 F.3d at 174. In construing the applicability of Pacifica, the
court noted that it was "a quite narrow decision upholding only the ruling of the FCC
sanctioning specific words in a specific context broadcast at a specific time of day." Id.
"The [Pacifica] Court expressly cautioned that it was not endorsing the reasoning of the
underlying FCC ruling, but only its ultimate holding that the Carlin monologue on
'Filthy Words' as broadcast at 2 p.m. violated the indecency ban of [18 U.S.C. §
1464]." Id. "IThe [Pacifica] Court. . . went out of its way to emphasize the limits of
its ruling." Id. (emphasis. added).
248 See PowE, supra note 6, at 209 ("A child is fully capable of waking before the
parent and reading the morning paper unsupervised.").
249 See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 769-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
some parents may desire to expose their children to Carlin's seven "dirty words.").
2 Id. at 210 ("[lIt is not true that the FBI or the CIA breaks into millions of
American homes to deposit the latest Sony radios. ... ).
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The FCC and the Court maintain that indecency regulations
assist parents who choose to limit their child's exposure to
offensive programming and are therefore a reflection of the
parent's interest.25 On the contrary, the result is a restriction of
parents' freedoms.252 By making choices for the parents, the FCC
is effectively limiting the parents' interests.25 3 However, this view
was not embraced by a majority of the Court when it considered
the issue in Pacifica.254 Only in Justice Brennan's dissent was it
recognized that some parents would not appreciate the government
making decisions regarding their children, or that there might
actually be some parents who would be receptive to the program
25 See Action, 11 F.3d at 178.
The FCC ... argues broadly that "parents can effectively supervise
their children only by co-viewing or co-listening, or, at a minimum,
by remaining actively aware of what their children are watching and
listening at all times." Because "it is not practical for parents to
exercise this type of control, ... parents who seek to avoid
exposing their children to indecency face a nearly impossible task if
such material is broadcast."
Id. (citing Respondents' Brief at 26, 30-31) (internal citations omitted).
S2 Id. (Edwards, J., concurring) ("[l]n effectively setting itself up as the final arbiter
of what American children may see and hear, the Government tramples heedlessly on
parents' rights to rear their children as they see fit and to inculcate in them moral values
of the parents' choosing.") (emphasis added).
, See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 769-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 749 (holding that the government may prohibit making indecent material
available to children, based in part upon the government's independent interest in the
well-being of its youth).
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content at issue."' Clearly, a failure to recognize these interests
evidences the morality crusade that the FCC has embarked upon.
The FCC has assumed that "regardless of the time of day
or night, parents cannot effectively supervise their children's
television or radio habits."256 In addition, it has decided to
shoulder the responsibility of ensuring that indecent material will
"never be broadcast, or, at most, . . . broadcast during times
when children are surely asleep."" 7 Thus, the FCC has clearly
failed to recognize that children are also entitled to constitutional
protection of First Amendment freedoms. 58
There is no question that the government has a compelling
interest in preventing children "both old enough to understand and
young enough to be adversely affected" from exposure to indecent
material.259  However, First Amendment values "are no less
Id. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
As surprising as it may be to individual Members of this Court,
some parents may actually find Mr. Carlin's unabashed attitude
towards the seven "dirty words" healthy, and deem it desirable to
expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the
taboo surrounding the words. Such parents may constitute a minority
of the American public, but the absence of great numbers willing to
exercise the right to raise their children in this fashion does not alter
the right's nature or its existence. Only the Court's regrettable
decision does that.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Action, 11 F.3d. at 185 (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
[Slome parents might prohibit their children from any exposure to
indecent material; some might modify a prohibition depending upon
the nature of the material and the age of the child; still others might
view or listen to indecent material with their children, either to
criticize, endorse or remain neutral about what they see or hear.
Id. (emphasis added).
256 See Action, 11 F.3d at 178 ("The [FCC's] argument appears to assume that,
regardless of the time of day or night, parents cannot effectively supervise their
children's television or radio habits. Accordingly, the government has not adduced any
evidence suggesting that the effectiveness of parental supervision varies by time of day
or night.").
7 id.
2m Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 n.14 (1977))
(holding that minors are entitled to constitutional protection of freedom of speech).
Id. (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n.29).
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applicable when government seeks to control the flow of
information to minors. "260 Thus, in order for the FCC to
legitimately protect against children being exposed to indecent
language broadcast over the radio, it must support regulations with
concrete data concerning the listening habits of children.261 This is
an obligation the FCC has failed to meet and its claims that a six
a.m. to midnight ban protects children is, therefore, confusing;
"we are puzzled by the government's regulation for the benefit of
a radio audience about which it has no information .... 262
Similarly, the FCC fails to provide any empirical data in
support of their definition of indecency. 26 3  "The statute casts
Congress in the role of defender of the 'decent, moral values' of
the country ,"64 Is this the proper role for the FCC to play?
Never has the government assumed responsibility for the morality
of the print media.265  Yet, it has chosen to impose
congressionally-approved moral judgments in regulations affecting
the broadcasting industry. 26 6  Currently, only a middle-class
morality standard is acceptable to be heard over the airwaves.
However, a middle-class morality standard does not represent the
individual moral standards of the audience and, as such, is not
necessarily acceptable for all. 267 This can be evidenced by the fact
26 Id. (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975)).
Contrary to the government's contention in Action, Pacifica did not overrule Erznoznik;
see id. at 178-79.
261 Action, 11 F.3d at 180.
262 Id.
See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 362. The Commission does not consider
any issues, collect any data, or exercise any expertise in defining what is "indecent."
264 Id. (citing 134 CONG. REC. S9912 (daily ed. July 26, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Helms)); see also supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
2W See generally Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697 (1931); see also supra note 53
and accompanying text.
2, See, e.g., Richard Harrington, Howard Stern: All id, No Lid, WASH. POST, Oct.
.28, 1993, at D1 (Howard Stern fined more than $1 million by the FCC for indecency
violations despite his overwhelming popularity); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
267 See supra text accompanying notes i28-34.
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that some of today's most popular programming form the
foundation of the indecency statute.268
V. Conclusion
The FCC has failed to properly define the boundaries of
indecency, and thus, has ruled with an uneven hand.26 9  A
transformation has taken place in which the FCC has become the
final "arbiter of taste and values" who possess the power to
impose subjective moral standards upon all radio broadcasters in
the nation.2 "0 Accordingly, the FCC has readily wielded that
28 See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 266, at Dl. One of today's most popular on-air
personalities is Howard Stem, an irreverent and raunchy radio show host who originates
from Infinity Broadcasting's WXRK studio in New York City. Stem has been the target
of more FCC indecency actions than any other single broadcaster. Id. The self-
proclaimed "king of all media," Stern's six a.m. to ten a.m. show reaches an audience
of 15 million people in 16 cities. Id. His is the top-rated show in New York and Los
Angeles, and among the top in Washington D.C. Id. He is also a top-selling author;
his book PRIVATE PARTS has appeared at the top of the nonfiction bestseller lists of The
Washington Post and The New York Times. Id. However, despite this overwhelming
public popularity, since 1987 Stem has been fined more than $1 million by the FCC for
repeated indecency violations. Id. The bases of the FCC actions stem from Stem's
frequent on-air discussions of sexual topics during which he is often crude and offending.
Id. However, if his program were "patently offensive," would 15 million people find
him appealing?
29 See generally Harrington, supra note 266 (arguing that a middle class morality
standard is not necessarily acceptable for all); see also supra text accompanying notes
128-34.
270 See Seth T. Goldsamt, Crucified by the FCC? Howard Stern, the FCC, and
Selective Prosecution, 28 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 203, 205-06, 208 (1988). The
author suggests that the FCC's regulation of indecent broadcasting may be influenced by
the community and interest groups since the FCC responds to listener complaints. In
response to the FCC's substantial fining of "The Howard Stem Show," the author argues
that broadcasters' First Amendment rights may be infringed because broadcasters would
refrain from broadcasting material that may conflict with the FCC's notions of indecency
in order to avoid fines, even though the content is protected by the First Amendment.
"Fearing large fines, radio stations without the necessary financial resources may be.
deterred from broadcasting 'shock jocks' whose radio content.., might conflict with
the FCC's conceptions of what is indecent." Id. at 805-06.
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power against the "politically incorrect" minority.27' This is
unacceptable. Governmental imposition of morality is not
constitutionally valid. As demonstrated, the existing justifications
for the lesser degree of First Amendment protection accorded
broadcasters are unconvincing.272 It is therefore time for Congress
to either loosen its hold over broadcast media content, or finally
submit the traditional press to the same scrutiny.
The First Amendment's constitutional protections should
not be reduced as a result of the vehicle that carries the message.
The principles that have guided us to a strong belief in freedom of
the press should be applied in whole form to the broadcast
medium. Thus, even speech labeled as indecent, though not
obscene, should be entitled to full constitutional
protection-whether written, spoken, or announced over the
airwaves. 
273
The FCC's attempt to "silence the voices that 'millions of
Americans"' want to hear is disturbing.274 But the implications are
far worse. Not only will the current regulation prohibit suggestive
patter on the radio, it will also inhibit new voices from
speaking.275  This reality is in total contradiction to the
preservation of a meaningful First Amendment. Consequently, for
the benefit of all listeners, young and old, the FCC's power to
2' See Farhi, supra note 8, at Al, A12; Jane Hall, Stern Causes Near-Riot at NYC
Signing, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at F2; Pat Widder, Airwaves Crackle in Debate
over Indecency, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1993, at B2.
27 See Bollinger, supra note 56, at 10 ("It is clear that the Court has not made
explicit just what is so 'unique' about the broadcast media that justifies legislative action
impermissible in the newspaper context."). See also supra notes 92-160 and
accompanying text.
27 See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 178 (D.C. Cir.
1993), vacated, reh 'g granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975) ("[S]peech that is neither
obscene . . . nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed
solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable
for them.") (emphasis added)).
' Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 10, at 363.
2" See Coyne, supra note 51, at 593 (resulting in "fastidiously balanced coverage
of very few controversial issues").
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"impoverish speech" 276 without concrete data or meaningful
support must be restrained.
Tara Phelan
276 Id.
